home *** CD-ROM | disk | FTP | other *** search
- **************************************************************************
- Security Bulletin 9218 DISA Defense Communications System
- June 23, 1992 Published by: DDN Security Coordination Center
- (SCC@NIC.DDN.MIL) 1-(800) 365-3642
-
- DEFENSE DATA NETWORK
- SECURITY BULLETIN
-
- The DDN SECURITY BULLETIN is distributed by the DDN Security
- Coordination Center (SCC) under DISA contract as a means of communicating
- information on network and host security exposures, fixes, and concerns
- to security and management personnel at DDN facilities. Back issues may
- be obtained via FTP (or Kermit) from NIC.DDN.MIL [192.112.36.5]
- using login="anonymous" and password="guest". The bulletin pathname is
- scc/ddn-security-yynn (where "yy" is the year the bulletin is issued
- and "nn" is a bulletin number, e.g. scc/ddn-security-9218).
- **************************************************************************
- + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +
- ! !
- ! The following important advisory was issued by the Computer !
- ! Emergency Response Team (CERT) and is being relayed unedited !
- ! via the Defense Information Systems Agency's Security !
- ! Coordination Center distribution system as a means of providing !
- ! DDN subscribers with useful security information. !
- ! !
- + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +
- ===========================================================================
- CA-92:14 CERT Advisory
- June 22, 1992
- Altered System Binaries Incident
-
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- The Computer Emergency Response Team/Coordination Center (CERT/CC) has
- received information regarding a series of significant intrusion
- incidents on the Internet. Systems administrators should be aware
- that many systems on the Internet have been compromised due to this
- activity. To identify whether your systems have been affected by the
- activity we recommend that all system administrators check for the
- signs of intrusion detailed in this advisory.
-
- This advisory describes the activities that have been identified as
- part of this particular incident. This does not address the
- possibility that systems may have been compromised due to other,
- unrelated intrusion activity.
-
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- I. Description
-
- The intruders gain initial access to a host by discovering a
- password for a user account on the system, exploiting a "+" in
- the "/etc/hosts.equiv" file, or any ".rhosts" files on the
- system. The intruder then connects to the system using rsh and
- attempts to become root on the compromised system. An alias of
- "decode" may be used to gain root privileges.
-
- II. Impact
-
- Having gained root access on a system, the intruder may make
- unauthorized changes to system binaries that can capture account
- information for both local and remote systems. In addition, the
- intruder adds "+ +" to any ".rhosts" files to which the intruder
- has access.
-
- III. Solution
-
- A. Check your systems for signs of intrusion due to this incident.
-
- 1. Check the login, telnet, and uucpd binaries (for example,
- "/bin/login", "/usr/ucb/telnet", and "/usr/etc/in.uucpd" on
- Sun systems) against copies from distribution media. Note that
- a check for creation or modification times and sizes is
- not sufficient to assure that the files have not been modified.
- The CERT/CC suggests that you compare the output of the
- "sum(1)" or "cmp(1)" command on both the distribution and
- installed versions of the binaries.
-
- 2. If the check from (A.1) indicates that your binaries have been
- modified, check for the presence of a password log file. Since
- the name of the logfile is often changed, the name of the file
- should be obtained using the "strings(1)" command on the Trojan
- login, uucpd, or telnet binary. Examples of filenames used on
- other systems are:
-
- "/usr/spool/. " (dot space)
- "/var/spool/secretmail/.l"
- "/var/spool/secretmail/.log"
- "/var/spool/secretmail/.tty"
- "/var/spool/secretmail/.lock"
- "/usr/tmp/.log"
- "/usr/spool/uucp/.sys"
- "/usr/spool/uucppublic/.hushlogin"
- "/usr/uucp/.sys"
- "/mnt2/lost+found/.tmp/.log"
- "/usr/spool/mqueue/.AFG001"
-
- Verify that the contents of files found using the "strings(1)"
- command do not contain valid username/password combinations.
-
- 3. Check for the presence of "+" in the "/etc/hosts.equiv"
- file.
-
- NOTE that Sun Microsystems installs the SunOS operating
- system with a default "+" in the /etc/hosts.equiv
- file for easy network access. This should be removed
- unless required in your operating environment and protected
- by a firewall network configuration. Leaving the "+"
- intact will allow any non-root user on the Internet to
- login to the system without a password.
-
- 4. Check the home directory for each entry in the "/etc/passwd"
- file for the presence of a ".rhosts" file containing
- "+ +" (plus space plus).
-
- 5. Assure that your "/etc/fstab", "/etc/inetd.conf", and
- "/etc/exports" files have not been modified.
-
- B. Take the following steps to secure your systems.
-
- 1. Save copies of the identified files to removable media and
- remove any password log files as found in (A.2) above.
-
- 2. Replace any modified binaries with copies from
- distribution media.
-
- 3. Remove the "+" entry from the "/etc/hosts.equiv"
- file and the "+ +" (plus space plus) entry from any
- ".rhosts" files.
-
- 4. Change ownership of the "/etc" directory to userid "root"
- if it is owned by "bin" (as distributed by Sun).
-
- 5. Change every password on the system and assure that the new
- passwords are robust using a package such as Crack or Cops
- (available via anonymous ftp from cert.org).
-
- 6. Inspect and restore any changes made to your "/etc/fstab",
- "/etc/exports", or "/etc/inetd.conf" files. If any
- modifications are found in these files, you will need to
- unmount file systems and restart daemons once the files
- have been restored. Alternatively the system could be
- rebooted.
-
- 7. Remove the "decode" alias from your global mail aliases
- file ("/etc/aliases" on Sun systems, "/usr/lib/aliases" on
- other UNIX systems).
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact CERT/CC or
- your representative in FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams).
-
- Internet E-mail: cert@cert.org
- Telephone: 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
- CERT/CC personnel answer 7:30 a.m.-6:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4),
- on call for emergencies during other hours.
-
- Computer Emergency Response Team/Coordination Center (CERT/CC)
- Software Engineering Institute
- Carnegie Mellon University
- Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
-
- Past advisories, information about FIRST representatives, and other
- information related to computer security are available for anonymous ftp
- from cert.org (192.88.209.5).
-
-
- ****************************************************************************
- * *
- * The point of contact for MILNET security-related incidents is the *
- * Security Coordination Center (SCC). *
- * *
- * E-mail address: SCC@NIC.DDN.MIL *
- * *
- * Telephone: 1-(800)-365-3642 *
- * *
- * NIC Help Desk personnel are available from 7:00 a.m.-7:00 p.m. EST, *
- * Monday through Friday except on federal holidays. *
- * *
- ****************************************************************************
-